










Hartley Dean  
 




Originally published in Critical social policy, 21 (3). pp. 267-286 © 2001 
SAGE Publications. 
 
You may cite this version as:  
Dean, Hartley (2001). Working parenthood and parental obligation 
[online]. London: LSE Research Online.  
Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000341     
Available online: July 2005 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of 
the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for 
non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute 
the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. 
 
This document is the author’s final manuscript version of the journal article, 
incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process.  Some 
differences between this version and the publisher’s version remain.  You are 









Contact LSE Research Online at: Library.Researchonline@lse.ac.uk 
Author’s final draft 
 
 






Published 2001 in Critical Social Policy, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 267-286, ISSN 0261-0183 
 
 





This article reports upon aspects of a small-scale qualitative study of low-income working 
families. The study was conducted in the context of recent policy changes in Britain that 
are intended to promote labour force participation by low-income parents, especially 
mothers. It is argued that while popular opinion is generally supportive of mothers taking 
paid employment, some deep-rooted ambivalence remains. Mothers in low-income 
families can experience the life-course transition involved as difficult in terms of the 
practical obstacles, the moral dilemmas and the ideological pressures. Without additional 
measures to support them in relation to their parental obligations low paid women are 




Fundamental changes are currently occurring in the relationship between labour 
markets and families, changes that current social policies tend to promote. This article 
discusses those changes and draws on recent qualitative research, conducted 
specifically in the British context, in order to address the implications. Of particular 
concern are the potentially problematic life-course transitions experienced by some 
women and the associated ambiguities that may be observed in moral and political 
discourse. The long-term trend towards women’s labour force participation has had 
vital emancipatory consequences, but policy interventions to enforce such 
participation can also increase the exploitation of working mothers. 
 
 
Working parenthood as a secular norm 
 
It is now commonly accepted that changes in the nature of economic forces at the 
global level are reflected in changes both in the structure of labour markets 
throughout the industrialised world and in the roles assumed by nation states (e.g. 
Burrows and Loader 1994, Esping-Andersen 1996, Held et al 1999). As labour 
markets become increasingly ‘flexible’ and the capacity of nation-states directly to 
ameliorate social inequality through welfare provision is compromised by the nature 
of international capitalism, so the nature of society itself is transformed. We now 
inhabit, some have argued, a risk society in which we must negotiate a more 
precarious relationship with the labour market and look to the state to do little more 
than facilitate the management of individualised risk (e.g. Beck 1992, Giddens 1994, 
Jordan 1998). In the context of such change, the composition and functioning of 
families has also been subject to radical change (e.g. Gittins 1993, Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 1995, Fox Harding 1996).  
 
The death of the male breadwinner? 
 
The ‘Beveridgian’ post-Second World War welfare settlement was premised on what 
has been defined as a male breadwinner model of the family (e.g. Lewis 1992, Land 
1994). Policy makers assumed, broadly speaking, that the ‘traditional’ family 
consisted of a breadwinning husband who could expect to enjoy life-long full-time 
employment, earning a wage sufficient – subject to universal family allowances, free health care and education – to support a dependant wife who would provide full-time 
care for their children and whose earnings (if any) would be incidental to the 
household income. Though arguably, the male breadwinner model never did fit the 
social reality (Lewis 2000), it has now been decisively overtaken by economic and 
social change (Land 1999). The assumptions on which the model depended were 
undermined – by the growing instability and casualisation of labour markets, the 
decline of full-time male employment and the expansion of labour force participation 
by women; and by the decline of marriage, the rise of cohabitation and an increase in 
the number of lone-parent families. Whether or not the social changes affecting 
families and household composition were themselves precipitated by labour market 
changes and by social policies is a contested issue: none the less it is such changes 
that began gradually to afford women (and other groups) the prospect of limited 
autonomy from family dependency (e.g. Finch 1989). The reality, however, is that in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century we have witnessed a certain polarisation 
between dual-earner families on the one hand and no-earner families on the other 
(with unemployed two-parent households and female headed lone parent-households 
disproportionately included among the latter). 
  However, the concept of the dual earner family encompasses a variety of 
forms, including arrangements involving part-time employment that may entail 
relatively few working hours and may generate comparatively low incomes. In fact, 
the dual career household, in which both partners enjoy life-long full-time 
employment, remains a comparative rarity since women’s employment is still far 
more likely than men’s to be part-time, impermanent and relatively poorly paid. Jane 
Lewis, for example, has suggested that ‘[t]he norm in the UK has become the “one-
and-a-half earner household”’ (2000: 53). The secular trend, therefore, is towards the 
acceptance of working parenthood as a norm, although the unequal distribution of 
responsibility for child-care between men and women and the lack of affordable 
formal childcare provision means it is a change that bears with particular salience 
upon mothers. 
 
Attitudes to change 
 
Social attitude data would indicate that by and large people in Britain and indeed 
across Western Europe are prepared increasingly to accept the norm of working 
parenthood. As Table 1 demonstrates a substantial and increasing majority consider 
that both members of a heterosexual cohabiting couple should contribute to household 
income; that having children need not inhibit the freedom of parents in relation, for 
example, to labour force participation; that a mother’s relationship to her children 
need not be prejudiced by her participation in the labour force. However, support for 
the compatibility of paid work and motherhood is more qualified when more precise 
circumstances are specified: in particular a majority in all the national survey samples 
remained concerned that pre-school children may suffer if their mothers worked full-
time (Scott et al 1998: 29). 
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The cross-national differences here are interesting. Both West Germany
1 and Sweden 
had and continue to have higher overall levels of funded daycare provision for 
children (though the level provision for very young children, aged 0-3, is similar in 
West Germany to that in Britain) (Moss 1996). In the Lander that formerly comprised West Germany – a socially conservative welfare regime that explicitly supported 
mothers who choose to stay at home to care for young children – there is less 
disagreement than in Britain with the idea that children can inhibit parents’ freedom, 
but more agreement that work is not detrimental to a mother’s relationship with her 
children: this may tend to suggest on the one hand that German people find that state 
incentives for mothers to stay at home amount perversely to a curtailment of freedom, 
but on the other that they have greater confidence in the quality of the daycare 
provision that is available in Germany. In Sweden – a classic example of a social 
democratic regime that explicitly encourages women’s labour force participation but 
also makes generous parental leave provision – there is more agreement than in 
Britain with the idea that both partners should contribute to household income and 
less disagreement with the idea that children can inhibit parents’ freedom: this would 
seem to suggest that Swedish people have higher expectations of the labour market 
both with regard to its accessibility and its capacity to accommodate the needs of 
parents. 
  Social attitude data, however, inevitably mask some of the complexities of 
people’s beliefs. Majority opinion may acknowledge the trend to working parenthood 
and attitudes to women’s employment have clearly been changing, but there is still a 
body of opinion that is opposed to combining parenthood and paid work. Hakim 
(1996), for example, has demonstrated that though some women in the labour force 
are committed to long-term careers, many others are content to work part-time and 
prefer to commit time to their roles as mothers and/or family carers. None the less, it 
would be a mistake to assume that individual attitudes are starkly polarised. Duncan 
and Edwards (1999) in their study of lone-mothers and paid work demonstrated that 
though some identified themselves primarily as mothers and others primarily as 
workers, there were also those that regarded both roles as integral to their identity. 
Other research has demonstrated that although lone-parents may well be strongly 
motivated to enter the labour market at some point in the future, they prefer to 
prioritise their role as parents until their children pass a certain age (Dean and Taylor-
Gooby 1992, Ford 1996, Bradshaw et al 1996). 
 
 
The British policy regime and its implications 
 
Britain’s New Labour government has declared that it is committed to ‘making it 
easier for families to balance work and home’ (Home Office 1998). However, this 
commitment emerged in the context of another – ‘work for those who can, security 
for those who cannot’ – and a determination that ‘[t]he new welfare state should help 
and encourage people of working age to work where they are capable of doing so’ 
(DSS 1998: 2). The implication of the ‘welfare-to-work’ approach for family policy is 
that poor families are expected to earn their way out of poverty. The New Deals, that 
made individual assistance available to enable and assist key groups to enter the 
labour market, have been targeted not only upon registered unemployed people, but 
upon lone parents and the partners of registered unemployed people (e.g. Millar 
2000). Though the government has stopped short of directly compelling mothers to 
work, attendance at work-focused interviews is to be made compulsory for lone 
parents in receipt of income support and the partners of those claiming job-seekers’ 
allowance. 
 
‘Joining up’ labour market and family policy  
So far as families are concerned, however, there are several components to New 
Labour’s welfare-to-work approach. The government aims on the one hand to make 
work pay for families – through the introduction of the working families tax credit 
(WFTC) and a modest national minimum wage, but on the other to make working 
parenthood easier through such ‘joined up’ initiatives as a national childcare strategy 
and the promotion of ‘family friendly employment’. 
  WFTC is a means-tested in-work cash benefit payable both to lone-parent and 
two parent families in which at least one parent is in full-time low paid employment. 
Although WFTC is more generous than family credit (the benefit it replaced) the 
advantages it offers to the poorest families are circumscribed – first, because gains in 
WFTC are off-set by reductions in other means-tested benefits, including housing 
benefit; secondly, because additional childcare tax credits under the WFTC scheme 
are generally insufficient to meet the full cost of formal childcare in many parts of the 
country (Daycare Trust 2000a) and, in any event, are not payable for the kinds of 
unregistered childcare upon which poorer families tend in practice to rely. WFTC is 
usually paid not as a conventional social security benefit, but in the claimant’s pay 
packet through the employer: the intention is to establish a clearer link in claimants’ 
minds between employment and the income they receive, though the consequence is 
to empower the principal breadwinner in the family (which in two parent families is 
still usually the man) in a way that will not necessarily benefit other family members 
(Goode et al 1998). What is more, WFTC might perversely function in the case of two 
parent families to restore the possibility that men with limited earning potential will 
none the less be able to support a ‘traditional’ family with a non-working wife (Land 
1999 and see Dean and Shah, forthcoming). Added to these limitations, past research 
has demonstrated that in-work benefit schemes have only a limited effect in 
promoting labour force participation (Marsh and McKay 1993, Ford et al 1996) and, 
because the recipients of in-work benefits seldom move on to higher paid jobs 
(Bryson and Marsh 1996), they are not especially effective in lifting families out of 
poverty.   
  In spite of these potential drawbacks, it may be argued that WFTC should be 
seen in context with the other measures New Labour has introduced. The national 
childcare strategy, though welcome, has not yet ensured an adequate supply of 
genuinely affordable childcare. The most recent statistics indicate that Britain’s 
‘childcare gap’ is closing only very slowly: the number of children aged 0-8 per 
registered childcare place has declined from 7.5 in 1999 to 6.9 in 2000 (Daycare Trust 
2000c). Relatively speaking the childcare strategy is only modestly funded and, 
because it places considerable emphasis on local partnerships, is heavily dependent on 
input from local government, voluntary and commercial sectors (e.g. Moss 2000). 
Legislation to promote ‘family friendly’ employment has in practice extended to that 
which was minimally required to comply with EU directives on working hours, 
parental leave and part-time working and, beyond this, government is relying 
primarily on campaign activity aimed at encouraging employers to change their 
working practices (Daycare Trust 2000b). 
 
Findings from research: the vulnerability of low-income families 
 
The author has recently undertaken a small-scale qualitative study to investigate the 
perceptions and day-to-day survival strategies of the kinds of families such policies 
are intended to benefit. The object was not at this early stage to evaluate the impact of the new policies so much as to explore the context into which they have been 
introduced. The research involved in-depth interviews with 47 low-income working 
families in two separate locations in South East England and half a dozen major 
employers. The principal findings, which are reported in greater detail elsewhere 
(Dean and Shah, forthcoming) were essentially threefold. 
  First, the study demonstrated the limited extent to which low-income families 
are in command of their day-to-day survival strategies. Our interviews sought to 
explore the total package of resources (in cash and in kind) on which the families 
depended and the kinds of work (both formal and informal) in which their members 
engaged. Though some could call on income or practical support from informal 
sources, relatives and friends, many did not or could not. If, in the present economic 
environment, wages cannot be relied upon to sustain such families an in-work benefit, 
like WFTC, is clearly necessary to their survival though it cannot by itself ensure that 
they will be lifted out of poverty. 
  Secondly, it would appear that ‘family friendly’ employment policies are 
likely most to benefit ‘valued’ (and therefore higher paid) employees rather that 
‘expendable’ (and therefore lower paid) workers. Because of a continuing shortfall in 
affordable childcare and the limited nature of the duties imposed on employers, there 
is a risk of a growing divide between secure middle-class families that will enjoy 
assisted childcare, career breaks and time off when they need it, and poorer working 
families who will be dependent on unassisted childcare from other family members or 
friends and receive only minimal concessions granted by reluctant employers. 
  Thirdly, there is some evidence that the pressure exerted by welfare-to-work 
policies may exacerbate both the exploitation of some low-paid workers and the sense 
of insecurity experienced by low-income working families. Some working parents 
were accepting low pay or were acceding to unreasonable demands from their 
employers in return for a minimal degree of flexibility to accommodate their needs as 
parents. Others, fearing competition from workers without parental responsibilities or 
even from illegal or undocumented labour, were prepared to forego or else felt 
disadvantaged by their new entitlements. Low paid employment will remain no less 
precarious as a result of the government’s supply-side initiatives and yet another 
observable effect of recent policy developments is further to stigmatise in the minds 
of some low-income working families the safety-net benefits that exist for non-
working families. This serves to undermine working families’ sense of security in the 
sense that they may feel they have ‘further to fall’ if they should lose their job. 
  Low-income working families could remain chronically vulnerable in spite of 
the raft of policies described. The experience of working parenthood is likely to be 
quite different for poor parents than for better off parents. Additionally, however, as 
we explored the nature of the respondents’ discourse in relation to working 
parenthood, another set of issues emerged and it is to these that this article now turns. 
 
 
Moral dilemmas and life-course transitions 
 
The study suggested that current policies may for some mothers be fuelling personal 
moral dilemmas and driving quite difficult life-course transitions. It emerged that, 
though people may be ignorant of policy detail, they tend to be acutely aware of the 
trends that policy is designed to promote. Within popular discourse, it would seem, 
there is a latent ambiguity concerning the new ‘norm’ of working parenthood on the 
one hand and moral expectations of parental responsibility on the other and, for some, this is experienced as a real tension. Policies to promote labour force participation by 
parents in general and mothers in particular can impact in very different ways. The 
meanings such policies have for lone-parents have to some extent been investigated 
(Bryson et al 1997, Duncan and Edwards 1999), but our findings suggest that these 
issues can be just as important within two parent families. Lone parents tended to rely 
on more diverse household survival strategies and to be better informed about policy 
matters than were parents in two parent households, but on some issues their feelings 
and experiences were very similar. 
  At issue here is both the nature of the commitment that some mothers have to 
their parenting role, but also the consequences that are entailed at the point when they 
step out of that role and enter the labour market. It is possible to explore these 
ambiguities or tensions at three different levels: at the level of every-day experience; 





Of the individual respondents in the study who were themselves in formal 
employment at the time of the interview, just over a quarter were women who had 
returned to the labour market after a period spent as a full-time parent or ‘home-
maker’. By and large they had been anxious to do so, both for the additional income 
and to ‘get out of the house’. However, the transition from full-time parenthood to 
paid worker could be difficult. In part, of course, the difficulties were practical: the 
difficulties of arranging childcare, negotiating manageable hours, dealing with the 
benefits system. The complexity and stress of the experience could be overwhelming: 
 
I was working long hours, not seeing anything of the kids, the money was junk, yeah, and 
I just wasn’t coping. And I had so many problems with housing benefit getting their act 
together, council tax benefit getting their act together and that, and I – it got too much. I 
got to the stage where I just wanted to scream. And I was so tired at the end of the week 
and I’d end up – I was coming home and I was just, basically, yelling at the kids. 
 
However, the difficulties could be deeper, if less tangible in nature: 
 
It’s all of a sudden – going back after all those years .... I hadn’t worked, and it’s a totally 
different life when you’re sort of working to being with kids and everything and I found it 
hard. It’s not like you’re leaving school, going into a job. You don’t have ‘What are we 
gonna have for dinner tonight’. You don’t have ‘Are the kids alright at school’..... And 
you know .... you’ve got sort of both: you’ve got to concentrate on your job, you’re there 
as well as you’re still at home – in your mind .... 
 
We have become accustomed to studying the ramifications of ‘youth transitions’, 
including the economic transition from school to work (e.g. Coles 1995). Arguably 
the transition that is negotiated – characteristically by mothers – from home to work is 
a socially constructed life-course event of parallel and increasing significance The 
idea of ‘family-friendly’ employment or ‘work-life balance’ may address the logistics 
of combining home and work, but not necessarily the dynamics and meaning of the 
transitions that some parents face. 
  Asked whether they enjoyed their jobs, and why, respondents often referred to 
intangible benefits or inherent satisfactions associated with their need for something 
to occupy them, for social contact or self-esteem. None the less some said they worked purely to earn money and a few regarded the routine nature of their work and 
lack of responsibility as a positive advantage in so far that their employment was not 
the primary source of their self-identity and need not interfere with those 
commitments that are for them of greater ontological significance:  
 
To an extent, not having any responsibility [laughs]. I’ve just got to sell people their 
cigarettes or whatever and that’s it, and its bye bye and you know ... 
 
People’s priorities are bound to differ, but underlying some of the tensions mothers 
were experiencing was the lack of choice about the transition they had negotiated: 
 
I don’t ever tell her [daughter] I have to come to work to earn the money. I say I enjoy it. 
You know I really enjoy what I do; it means that we can do these things, we can have this 
house, we can have this food, you can do this but it’s a means to an end as well as being 
something I like to do. But I have no choice. I have to come to work. So – but I do have a 
choice, ‘cos I could go on the dole I suppose, but it’s not a real choice is it? It’s not a real 
choice. 
 
If respondents differed or were ambivalent about the practical choices open to them, 
they also differed or felt ambivalent about the business of organising childcare. In 
particular, they were divided as to whether the kind of informal childcare 
arrangements to which most (but not all) low-income families are obliged to turn is in 
fact the best kind of childcare, or whether it places unhelpful strains upon 
relationships with the family members or friends upon whom they rely: 
 
For me personally, I’d rather the kids be with a member of my family whom I trust, and 
knows them and knows me, than, you know, to employ an outsider as a childminder and 
pay them X amount of money per week. I think the care is more like it’s – it’s just loving 
care isn’t it: it’s unconditional, you know. 
 
If I could have, you know, like a childminder who’d come here: someone that was 
regular, that you just didn’t have to do them a favour back. You could pay them and it’d 
be over and done with and you could rely on them every day. That would be – it would 
make my life so much less stressful. 
 
Underlying the practical dilemmas of low-income working families, there are 




Working parents may quite legitimately regard themselves primarily as workers, 
primarily as parents or as both, and to treat them uniformly as economic actors 
responding to economic incentives is to commit what has been called the ‘rationality 
mistake’ (Barlow et al 2000). With this in mind we asked respondents a morally 
loaded question: ‘What is more important for you, having money to spend on your 
children or having time to spend with them?’. Unsurprisingly, very few respondents 
would admit that only money matters and, although a third of the sample played safe 
and said that time and money were both important (and/or that this depended on the 
children’s age), almost half the sample said clearly that time was more important: 
 Time to spend with ‘em. I’d give anything not to be having to work, so I could spend time 
for them. I kill meself over it dun’ I. Always complaining about not being able to spend 
time with ‘em .... I’d rather be at home. Yeah. 
 
This tends to confirm that the pressure to seek work that is now being directed not 
only to lone parents but also to the partners of the unemployed may indeed amount to 
encouragement to pursue a course that some mothers regard as morally undesirable 
(cf. Ford 1996, Duncan and Edwards 1999). Significantly, the quotation above comes 
from a mother in a two-parent family where both partners feel it necessary to work: 
social policy may be in step with prevailing economic pressures and cultural 
expectations, but it is not necessarily in step with the aspirations or preferences of all 
parents. Once again it is a perceived lack of choice that sharpens the dilemma and the 
weight of other people’s expectations: 
 
I always hated having a childminder. I always felt torn. I always felt like crying, going off 
to work. Having to dosh out all that money when I should be at home. Margaret Thatcher
2 
says we should be at home looking after our children. The social pressures on being sort 
of a working parent were quite hard. You were damned if you did, you were damned if 
you didn’t sort of thing. A single parent on income support, you felt people were pointing 
the finger at you. If you went out to work, people were pointing the finger at you. 
 
Some mothers handled the dilemma by restricting the amount they were prepared to 
work: 
 
... it was always my intention when I had them [children] that I would work less and 
probably there wouldn’t be so much money .... and that’s why I work part-time .... 
Because I wouldn’t offload them onto somebody else just for the little bit extra I might be 
able to manage to earn .... It’s not right, and they deserve – they deserve more than that in 
my opinion. 
 
Others who worked full-time felt a mixture of resentment and guilt: 
 
Every time I read the reports at nursery I think, ‘Oh I’m missing out here’. I say to them, 
‘Oh, I’m starting to potty train him’ and they says, ‘Oh, we do that as well’. I went, ‘Oh, 
alright then. You’ll probably do it a lot quicker than I will.’ .... Well I’d like to give a – 
put in an input. It’s like when he started walking – it’s like they saw his first steps .... so 
it’s little things like that. 
 
For low-income families, economic necessity takes precedence over economic 
opportunity and parental duty takes precedence over parental fulfilment. The effect of 
economic globalisation on labour markets is associated with what Bea Cantillon has 
called a ‘simultaneous sociological transition’: a process of individualisation that frees 
women to enter an increasingly precarious labour market, while turning carework  
into something that must be either sub-contracted or borne as an additional burden 
(Cantillon and Van den Bosch 2000: 1-2). Recent social policy reforms contain mixed 
messages concerning the nature of familial responsibility. For example, recent youth 
justice reforms place greater responsibility on parents for the behaviour of their 
children (Kroll and Barrett 1995) and through such initiatives as the National Family 
and Parenting Institute and the Sure Start scheme (Home Office 1998, and see Moss 
2000) the New Labour government aims directly to influence the standards of 
parenting, yet the concurrent pressure upon parents to engage with the labour market 





Respondents were by and large quite well engaged with the general policy debate 
about whether or not it is a good idea to get as many parents as possible out to work. 
More than half (25) thought it was a good idea, although some only subject to 
provisos that parents – and here they generally meant mothers – should not be 
required to work until their children were older or that they should only be expected 
to work part-time. The Blairite language of rights and responsibilities is clearly 
permeating popular discourse: 
 
I’m saying that people that can work should go out to work for a couple of hours even – 
‘cos its not fair on other people .... 
 
It is a good idea. At the end of the day people .... [that] just stay on Income Support .... 
they’re not bothered to improve themselves or the children and basically just take 
everything for granted. 
 
About the single parent thing and getting them out to work, I think getting them out to 
work is a good idea to an extent because it does improve your self-esteem and it gives 
you – you know, just broadening your horizons is a good thing. 
 
However, well over a third of the sample insisted that getting parents out to work was 
not necessarily a good thing; it is important that people should want to go to work: 
 
I think if they’re happy to do it, if they feel they can cope with it, but I don’t think parents 
should be pressed into it, ‘cos I could see if my circumstances were completely different – 
if I didn’t have family nearby, etc. and I wasn’t happy with the childcare arrangements in 
the area, then I wouldn’t be happy to leave my children no matter how much anybody 
tried to pressure me into going back to work ... 
 
If they want to, yes. Then there has to be good childcare. It’s this sort of almost insisting 
that everybody goes to work that I’m a bit wary [of]. It seems like a police state to me: 
you know, that you’re going to get punished if you don’t. 
 
The discursive repertoires on which people draw in their reactions to welfare reform 
are complex (see Dean with Melrose 1999) and respondents were able to combine 
support for the principle of working parenthood with often quite deep-seated 
concerns. The general thrust of government policy is that the best way to manage the 
economic risks to which families are subject is for them to engage with the labour 
market. However, this is not best achieved by compulsion. The protectionist welfare 
state of the Keynesian era enjoyed a measure of popular support often in spite of its 
dirigiste tendencies, because it was perceived as providing a degree of material 
security. There is a danger that if the state should offer less security while attempting 
none the less to change people’s behaviour, it will jeopardise the trust that people 
have in welfare systems. The social security system is neither an effective nor an 
appropriate way of regulating labour market behaviour (Dean 2000, Cantillon and 
Van den Bosch 2000). 
  A similar point emerges from a recent evaluation of Britain’s experimental 
‘New Deals’ for lone mothers and disabled people which has observed that the positive and supportive role played by New Deal Personal Advisers in assisting those 
who wanted to access the labour market ‘may have gone some way towards 
persuading lone parents and disabled people that these programmes are meant to help, 
not to harm, them and so have helped to restore some trust in government towards 
them. Compulsion could put that at risk.’ (Millar 2000: 39). Our evidence would tend 
to suggest that this conclusion has validity within a broader context. New Labour’s 
objective with regard to the promotion of working parenthood could work with the 
grain of popular aspirations, but it must also take account of popular fears that stem 
from the insecurities that low-income parents face in an increasingly predatory labour 
market and from the tensions they experience between differently constituted notions 





The intentions implied by New Labour’s welfare-to-work agenda might be regarded 
as radically supportive not necessarily of a dual worker family model, but an 
‘individualised adult worker model’, though, as Jane Lewis (2000) has pointed out, to 
be effective this would need to be underpinned by collective supports for unpaid 
carework in the form of cash and/or services to an extent and on a scale that the 
government does not at present contemplate. In the meantime, as we have observed, 
the transition from full-time mother or ‘homemaker’ to working parent can be in 
many ways problematic. People by and large accept the trend to working parenthood, 
but the pressure that is being applied for mothers in particular to return to work does 
not necessarily accommodate a deeply rooted ambivalence in popular opinion. What 
is more, just as the experiences of young people as they effect the transition from 
education to the labour market are becoming increasingly polarised (Coles 2000), so 
indeed are the life-course transitions experienced by mothers when they (re)enter the 
labour market. In spite of the efforts of the New Labour government, it would appear 
that the gap between the incomes of the richest and the poorest families in Britain 
continues to widen (Gordon, et al 2000), while the disparity between the quality of 
‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ employment – or, in the popular vernacular, between ‘career’ 
jobs and ‘crap’ jobs (see Lloyd 1999) – remains as stark as ever. There is therefore a 
world of difference between the experience of those women who re-enter career jobs, 
and those that seek to supplement their family income by taking low-paid and often 
precarious jobs at the periphery of the labour market. No fewer than four members of 
our interview sample, by the time we spoke to them, had either left their employment 
or were about to leave because of intolerant, inflexible or ‘macho’ attitudes on the 
part of their employers to the needs of employees with parental responsibilities: for 
them, the transition to work would be a cyclical process as they moved from job to 
job. 
  Ironically, the advances that have been achieved by career women appear to 
have generated a backlash in so far that, according to Management Today (.......), 
many childless executives are now resentful of the childcare subsidies, leave 
entitlements and other ‘perks’ enjoyed by those of their colleagues whose ‘lifestyle 
choices’ extend to having children. The objection may appear in the circumstances 
trivial, or just selfish, but its logic is dangerous. It implies that only those who can 
afford to do so should choose to become parents. More seriously, perhaps, current 
employment policies do run the risk of further exacerbating gender inequalities and a 
recent report by the Industrial Society (Reeves 2000) has rightly urged that any further development of statutory maternity rights must be matched by a 
commensurate development in the rights of fathers, since employers might otherwise 
become increasingly reluctant to engage women. Less obvious however is the risk 
identified above that such policies might exacerbate class inequalities. This is an issue 
where gender and class interests intersect. 
  The ideal of working parenthood or, using Lewis’ term, of an individualised 
adult worker model is capable of attracting some complex and unusual political 
alliances. Just as the principle of parental responsibility that underpinned legislation 
such as the 1990 Child Support Act appealed to a number of different ideological 
constituencies that would otherwise be opposed (Dean 1995), so, albeit for slightly 
different reasons, does the principle of working parenthood. It is potentially attractive 
to liberal feminists, libertarian socialists and neo-liberals, but unattractive to welfare 
feminists, ‘ethical’ socialists and neo-conservatives. It is a principle that elevates 
formal freedom in the labour market above ‘traditional’ family values. The key 
questions are: to what extent must the interdependencies that are associated with the 
fulfilment of parental responsibility be situated within an exploitative familial 
context?; and to what extent does working motherhood trade familial dependency for 
economic exploitation? A resolution to the first question requires a transformation 
within gendered relations of dependency; a resolution to the second a transformation 
within capitalist relations of exploitation. Social policy by itself cannot make working 
parenthood compatible with parental responsibility, but it could go much further than 
at present. This would entail making sure, on the one hand, that men have the same 
incentives as women to combine employment and parental responsibilities and, on the 
other, that the poorest working parents have the same substantive protection in terms 





1  The ‘old’ West Germany – prior to re-unification – is cited here as an example of the 
classic ‘Bismarkian’ welfare state. In East Germany, childcare provision had been 
universal. 
 
2  It is striking that, although this interview was conducted 10 years after Margaret Thatcher 
had been Prime Minister, her name should still be invoked to characterise the view that 
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